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Locating the Cyprus Problem: 
Ethnic Conflict and the Politics of Space
Yiannis Papadakis
The relation of Cyprus to this group does not simply arise from its geographi-
cal location…but more importantly from our faith in common ideals and 
objectives as well as from common historical experience.
Statement by the President of the Republic of Cyprus, June 1962
I thank you for offering Cyprus the possibility to accede where it belongs his-
torically, geographically, politically and culturally.
Statement by the President of the Republic of Cyprus, April 20031
I. Cyprus/Kypros/Kibris
The precise geopolitical location of Cyprus has been intensely dis-
puted throughout the course of the Cyprus Problem. The standard 
map used in Greek Cypriot classrooms for decades was that of Greece, 
with Kypros appearing in a cut-out to the right of Crete. Cyprus was 
thus geologically attached to Greece, in line with the Greek Cypriot 
demand of Enosis—union with “motherland Greece.” Politically, how-
ever, the map rather favored Turkish Cypriots who spoke instead of 
“motherland Turkey.” No need for them to cut and paste; they only 
needed to extend the standard map of Turkey a little bit to the south 
in order to include Kibris in the south of their motherland. In opposi-
tion to Enosis, Turkish Cypriots voiced their own demand for Taksim, 
partition. Divided as the two sides stood in terms of their geopolitical 
identification with different motherlands, they were united in the view 
that they firmly belonged in Europe and “the West.” Maps of Cyprus’ 
general area, employed by both sides, were always cut so as to present 
Cyprus in the east of Europe, never in the north of Africa or the west 
of the Middle East. Thus, during April 2003 the Greek Cypriot Presi-
dent of the Republic of Cyprus, Tassos Papadopoulos, located Cyprus 
unequivocally in Europe during the signing of the Accession Treaty to 
the European Union (EU), as exhibited in the second quote above.
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Yet, although Cyprus joins the EU, within the United Nations it 
remains in the Asiatic group of states, while previously it was located 
the Afro-Asiatic group (that eventually broke up). The first President 
of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, located Cyprus differently in his 
first address before the UN General Assembly during June 1962: “Our 
geographical location in the midst of three continents and our close 
relations with the peoples of these continents open great possibilities 
and create responsibilities for us.”2 Addressing the UN Afro-Asiatic 
group on the same day, Makarios confirmed Cyprus’ belonging in the 
group by invoking not only a common geography but also a common 
history (see first quote) in words almost identical to those used forty 
years later by the current President of the Republic of Cyprus. Except 
notice that the first unequivocally located Cyprus in Afro-Asia, allud-
ing to the politics of anti-colonialism and the Non-Aligned Movement 
in which Cyprus would play a significant role, while the second trium-
phantly located Cyprus in Europe and the West.
This essay discusses the Cyprus Problem by focusing on the politics 
of space to illustrate general political trends and disputes in this island 
inhabited by Muslims and Christians, Turkish Cypriots and Greek 
Cypriots, and located at the margins of Europe, the Middle East, and 
Africa under the shadow of two different motherlands. In particu-
lar, it discusses the local struggles to evade the geopolitics of hybrid-
ity or categorical ambiguity that ironically resulted in what could be 
regarded as a most hybrid outcome: part inside and part outside of the 
coveted destination of the EU. One aspect of the politics of space that 
has, for a change, united the people of Cyprus was their avowed anti-
orientation, a move away from the “Orient” expressed in the desire to 
join the EU as final confirmation of belonging in the “civilized West.”3 
This essay does not provide a comprehensive account or explanation 
of the Cyprus Problem, something that lies beyond the abilities of this 
particular (Greek Cypriot) author, but works on the level of how the 
Cyprus Problem has been interpreted in different periods and by dif-
ferent groups. It is written from the viewpoint of a social anthropolo-
gist, a particular angle (or bias) interested in local actors’ views and 
agency, which is often ignored in International Relations approaches 
toward the Cyprus Problem.4 The location of Cyprus in the wider dis-
ciplinary agendas has been itself marked by ambiguity “because it can-
not easily be fitted into the regional categories (Europe, Near/Middle 




Capitals often develop as the primary sites for the inscription of politi-
cal ideologies, whether those of colonial elites or those of the sub-
sequent nation-state. The British colonial period lasted from 1878 to 
1960 when Cyprus became independent. During this period, Greek 
and Turkish nationalisms in Cyprus gained widespread appeal at the 
grassroots level. By the 1940s the two major communities in Cyprus 
(Greek Cypriots amounting to around 80% of the population and Turk-
ish Cypriots to 18%) had come to identify themselves as Greeks and 
Turks: as pure Greeks and nothing but Greeks, or pure Turks and noth-
ing but Turks.
Nicosia was the center of the British colonial administration and, 
as in other colonies, education was a highly politicized issue. Michael 
Given has provided a fascinating account of the ways in which the 
politics of education were embodied in the architecture of educational 
institutions.6 After 1931, when a crowd of Greeks burned the colonial 
Government House amidst calls for Enosis, the British attempted to 
oppose their demands by creating a new concept of local identity: the 
Cyprus mélange. The Greek’s call for Enosis was based on the view that 
ever since antiquity Cyprus and its people had always been Greek. In 
countering this, the British proposed a different version of history. It 
was based on historicist premises similar to those employed by Greek 
nationalists in Cyprus, even as they tried to oppose it. They proposed 
instead the historical presence since antiquity of a uniquely Cypriot 
people and culture. “For a few years there was a determined, but 
clearly pointless, attempt on the part of imperialist ideologues, to pass 
off the Cypriots as a mélange of different races, neither wholly East-
ern, nor wholly Western, but an amorphous mixture blend of the two 
without any original or essential character.”7 The writings of colonial 
archaeologists were full of terms like Cypriot hybrid civilization, fused 
and mingled style, or conglomerate style.
The physical expression of what the British meant by the Cyprus 
mélange was the building constructed to house the Teacher’s Train-
ing College of Cyprus.8 This was the site where local teachers were to 
be trained according to colonial directives (it is currently the central 
premises of the University of Cyprus). It was designed by utilizing 
various historic (Phoenician, Venetian, Ottoman) and contemporary 
vernacular stylistic references. Yet it contained no Classical Greek ref-
erences whatsoever. The Greeks of Cyprus reacted by building Par-
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thenon-like schools, with nothing but Classical Greek references. The 
Turks of Cyprus, having come under the influence of Turkish Kemalist 
nationalism, built mostly in a modern, functional style inspired by 
the Kemalist ideals of modernization and Westernization. The Brit-
ish insistence on a hybrid, amorphous Cyprus mélange was countered 
by fervent claims that the Greeks of Cyprus were pure and authentic 
Greeks.9 Regarding Turkish Cypriots, the British initially favored their 
local Islamic religious leaders in order to direct them away from their 
rising identification with Kemalist Turkish nationalism. In turn, the 
Turks of Cyprus reacted by fervently embracing the ideals of Kemalist 
Turkish nationalism.10
III. Lefkosia/Lefkosha
In 1955, the Greeks of Cyprus embarked upon an armed anti-colonial 
campaign with the aim of Enosis, setting up a fighting organization by 
the name of EOKA. The Turks of Cyprus responded by demanding the 
partition of Cyprus, Taksim, creating their own armed fighter’s group 
under the name TMT. During that period, the British came to rely more 
on the Turks in order to fill posts in government services, especially the 
police, because the Greeks had stopped working for—or cooperating 
with—the colonial administration. This increased tension and animos-
ity between the two communities as Turkish policemen were called 
into action against the Greek insurgents. This policy, which some inter-
pret as a conscious British “Divide and Rule” ploy, led to interethnic 
killings, culminating in large-scale riots in Nicosia and the first physi-
cal barbed-wire division of the capital.11
The 1960 independence of Cyprus found the two communities intent 
on pursuing their separate aims of Enosis and Taksim. The colonial cap-
ital Nicosia now passed into the hands of the independent Republic of 
Cyprus government, called Lefkosia by Greek Cypriots and Lefkosha 
by Turkish Cypriots. In December 1963, the most violent confronta-
tions between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots took place first in 
Lefkosha/Lefkosia and then spread to the rest of Cyprus. Armed con-
frontations continued intermittently until 1967. Lefkosia/Lefkosha was 
divided once more, but this time the division was more permanent and 
large scale. In 1964, the Green Line was established, separating the two 
ethnic groups on a north-south axis. The UN was called in as a peace-
keeper. The line passed right through the old walled city, once again 
dividing Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot neighborhoods. Turkish 
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Cypriots established their own enclaves and administrative machinery, 
which were out of bounds for Greek Cypriots. Turkish Cypriots moved 
en masse into such enclaves while many Greek Cypriots moved out. 
The population of the island was becoming increasingly segregated 
along ethnic lines.12
From 1963 to the end of 1967, the interaction between the two ethnic 
groups was limited. In Lefkosia/Lefkosha, along with the rest of the 
island, village names, place names, and road names were changed 
according to who administered the area. Space came to be “cleansed” 
from other’s references, and imbued with names reflecting the history, 
geography, and traditions of the ethnic group that controlled it. The two 
major ethnic groups were living not only in different spatial domains 
but also in different domains of historical time. Greek Cypriots lived 
in “Greek historical time,” following the major commemorative ritual 
calendar of Greece, while Turkish Cypriots living in “Turkish histori-
cal time” followed the ritual calendar of Turkey. During this period 
the economy of Cyprus was booming but it was the Greek Cypriots 
who benefited from these new economic opportunities, while Turkish 
Cypriots were living in poverty and isolation inside the enclaves.
After 1968, however, the tension between the two ethnic groups 
gradually eased and people slowly began to interact once more. Turk-
ish Cypriots continued to live in the enclaves, which now opened up. 
They began to work and trade with Greek Cypriots. Negotiations 
between the two ethnic groups resumed in the hope of finding a way 
to break the political impasse. In July 1974, though, a Greek Cypriot 
right-wing extremist group by the name of EOKA B launched a coup 
against Makarios, the President of the Republic of Cyprus, with the 
aim of uniting Cyprus with Greece. They were aided by the junta that 
controlled Greece as well as the junta-controlled Greek army contin-
gent in Cyprus. As a result of the coup, Turkey militarily intervened 
in Cyprus, and the island was divided from end to end. The ensu-
ing population exchanges made the two parts almost totally ethni-
cally homogeneous, resulting in a Greek Cypriot southern side and a 
Turkish Cypriot northern side. The 1974 division of Cyprus separating 
Lefkosia/Lefkosha in two is still in place while negotiations for a fed-
eral solution continue intermittently.
Even though both sides accepted a form of federation as a basis 
for a solution, the form this should take is highly disputed. Broadly 
speaking, Greek Cypriots strive for more integration while Turkish 
Cypriots desire more separation, all within a federal framework.13 
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Greek Cypriots aim for the integration of the island in a framework 
that would allow Greek Cypriot refugees to return to their pre-1974 
homes. Turkish Cypriots view such integration of populations with 
suspicion and fear. Among Turkish Cypriots there is little, if any, desire 
for those displaced in 1974 or before to return. A further significant 
political development was the declaration in 1983 of the areas under 
Turkish Cypriot control as an independent state, namely, the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus. The self-declared Turkish Cypriot state, 
however, has not achieved recognition by international bodies such as 
the UN, the EU, or other states with the exception of Turkey. It is the 
Republic of Cyprus, i.e., the Greek Cypriot-controlled state, which is 
internationally recognized as the island’s legitimate government. The 
lack of recognition of the Turkish Cypriot state allowed Greek Cypriots 
to levy an international trade embargo against it. Along with other fac-
tors, this led to economic stagnation in the Turkish Cypriot side in con-
trast to rapid economic development in the Greek Cypriot south after 
1974, creating a large economic disparity between the two sides.
The physical construction of the division itself is indicative of the 
two sides’ official views. Ledra Palace Hotel, located just outside the 
walls of the old city of Lefkosia/Lefkosha, found itself inside the divi-
sion, becoming a UN barracks. The two sides’ checkpoints, known as 
the Ledra Palace checkpoints, are where tourists and (rarely) locals are 
allowed to cross. The Greek Cypriot checkpoint is a small, temporary 
structure in contrast to its Turkish Cypriot counterpart, which is a 
large concrete building over which a large banner proclaims “Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus Forever.” The Green Line, or Dead Zone 
as it is also called by Greek Cypriots, is constructed out of barbed wire 
in the south allowing visual contact with the north, which can easily 
be lifted. This contrasts with the walls appearing in the middle of the 
road, barring visual contact, built on the Turkish Cypriot side. For 
Greek Cypriots the division is officially constructed as impermanent; 
for Turkish Cypriots it is permanent.
Given that Ledra Palace is the prime site through which the flow of 
people has been taking place (mostly foreigners until April 2003, when 
the checkpoints opened, allowing freer access for locals), it gave the 
two sides the opportunity to present their views to everyone passing 
through. On the Turkish Cypriot side this took the form of posters and 
leaflets, mostly focusing on the events of 1963–67, while on the Greek 
Cypriot side such posters focused on 1974. Turkish Cypriots officially 
presented their case as one of ethnic persecution, killing, and victim-
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ization by Greek Cypriots between 1963–74, when they lived under 
poor conditions inside the enclaves. The past was presented as one of 
unremitting conflict, thus legitimating separation with the argument 
that the past proved that the two communities could not live together.
Greek Cypriots made no mention of Turkish Cypriots in the pre-
sentation of their case on the south side of Ledra Palace. Instead, they 
focused on the effects of the Turkish military offensive (“the barbaric 
Turkish invasion”) and the victimization this entailed for Greek Cypri-
ots in terms of people killed, dislocated, and missing, as well as in 
terms of the devastating economic consequences.
Turkish Cypriots were officially encouraged to only think of nega-
tive sides of the past when they lived together with Greek Cypriots. 
After 1974, they were designated as inhabitants of their own free and 
independent country where they could now live in peace. Lefkosha 
was their capital. From this perspective, the existence of another side 
should not even be considered; it should be forgotten. In other words, 
the official Turkish Cypriot viewpoint posited that there should be no 
sense of loss or incompleteness, but rather one of relief and whole-
ness in having obtained their own state. From this point of view, then, 
Lefkosha was a capital in its own right, and not a divided one. Next to 
it simply lay the capital of another state, Lefkosia, the capital of the 
Greek Cypriots.
Turkish Cypriots strove to convey this by flying the flag of their 
self-declared state, along with the one of Turkey, on their side of the 
dividing line. The two flags also flew on the tallest and most visible 
monument in Lefkosha, the Selimiye Mosque. While flags normally do 
not fly outside mosques, in this case they did due to the monument’s 
height and visibility from both sides. The most dramatic attempt to 
impress upon all the existence and authority of the Turkish Cypriot 
state was the creation of two enormous flags (of Turkey and the Turk-
ish Republic of Northern Cyprus) by whitewashing a large area of the 
Pentadaktylos/Beshparmak mountain range, visible from miles away 
in the south.
For Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, officially Lefkosia was a 
divided capital since they aspired to a united Cyprus and its capital. 
For Greek Cypriots, the current division was unjustly imposed by the 
Turkish forces and, hopefully, temporary and reversible. When Greek 
Cypriots spoke of the two parts of Lefkosia, the southern part was 
usually referred to as “free Lefkosia” (eleftheri Lefkosia) while the north-
ern was “occupied Lefkosia” (katehomeni Lefkosia). (They also talked 
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of “free Cyprus” and “occupied Cyprus.”) On the Greek Cypriot side 
of the divide flew the flags of the Republic of Cyprus next to the flag 
of Greece. After 1974, Greek Cypriots adopted an official policy of 
rapprochement toward Turkish Cypriots that was both future and past 
oriented. Regarding the future, this necessitated expressions of good 
will toward Turkish Cypriots and the encouragement of meetings and 
joint events with the aim of persuading them to accept a common 
future in a united island. As for the past, Greek Cypriots stressed the 
positive aspects of the past, when the two groups were living together. 
The past was presented as one of peaceful coexistence, while periods 
of interethnic violence were ignored. The past was said to prove that 
since the two communities lived together well, they could again live 
together peacefully in a future reunited Cyprus. This, of course, was 
the counterargument to the equally historicist and selective Turkish 
Cypriot official construction of the past.14
The two symbols used by the municipal authorities on each side of 
Lefkosia/Lefkosha are revealing of the two views. Both feature the cir-
cular Venetian Walls of Nicosia, a welcome symbol of Western heritage. 
Both sides readily adopted Western monuments as part of their own 
heritage, in contrast to each other’s monuments (i.e., Greek-Byzantine 
or Ottoman-Turkish), which were neither adopted nor respected. The 
Greek Cypriot municipal symbol features a dove inside the circular 
outline of the walls, symbolizing past peaceful coexistence and the 
hope for peace and future unification. The Turkish Cypriot symbol fea-
tures a Muslim monument inside the circular outline of the walls, the 
Mevlevi Tekke, under which the date 1958 appears. Beneath the Turk-
ish Cypriot municipality symbol appears the inscription “Founded on 
16-6-58,” referring to the de facto creation of separate Turkish Cypriot 
municipalities. It also acts as an implicit reminder of interethnic strife 
that took place then.
IV. In Between
Lefkosia/Lefkosha is a capital divided on the ground, though united 
underground (as will be explained). No mutually accepted maps of 
Lefkosha/Lefkosia exist because each side erases the other’s presence 
from official maps, leaving the other side blank. Likewise, each side’s 
officialdom erases the other’s experiences of suffering and its fears and 
concerns. Each focuses only on its own side. The events of 1974, for 
example, have been officially designated by the Greek Cypriot side 
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as “the barbaric 1974 Turkish Invasion.” It is known by the Turkish 
Cypriots as the “Happy 1974 Peace Operation.” The chasm of the Dead 
Zone has come to divide pain as each side only talks of its own vic-
tims despite the use of a common vocabulary regarding people killed, 
displaced, and missing. The Dead Zone also divides memories and offi-
cial approaches toward the Cyprus Problem, allowing for no common 
ground, just as it absolutely divides the two sides “on the ground.”
Yet, at the same time, the Dead Zone itself has been gradually 
claimed by activists since the late 1980s as their own common ground. 
Lying in the middle, neither on one side nor the other, Ledra Pal-
ace, although symbolic of the division, became the prime site where 
attempts at interethnic dialogue and conflict resolution took place 
involving activist groups from both sides. The UN authorities often 
facilitated the organization of such events and allowed the use of the 
premises of the hotel-turned-UN-barracks for such purposes. The loca-
tion of the hotel inside the dividing line and in the capital turned it into 
the ideal site. The bi-communal use of this in-between site is illustra-
tive of another development in post-1974 Cyprus, whereby concerned 
citizens from both sides tried to find ways to meet and enter into dia-
logue. They also worked at intervening in the activities of both sides in 
ways conducive to reconciliation.
The largest and most successful bi-communal project involved the 
capital itself. This was a joint project initiated by the two mayors of 
Lefkosia/Lefkosha, Lellos Demetriades and Mustafa Akinci. It was a 
common vision for the development of the city, known as the Nicosia 
Master Plan. Part of this effort was the creation of a jointly managed 
sewerage system for the whole city that unites the divided capital 
underground. Indeed, the only jointly accepted map of Lefkosia/Lefko-
sha is the underground map.15
Bi-communal efforts—in the form of conflict resolution seminars, 
meetings of various groups, and cultural events—were normally given 
more encouragement from the Greek Cypriot authorities in line with 
their official policy of rapprochement with Turkish Cypriots. At the 
same time, there was marked hesitation in case they led to, or implied, 
the recognition of the Turkish Cypriot side as a state.16 Greek Cypriots 
who disagreed with such bi-communal efforts often stood outside the 
Greek Cypriot checkpoint of Ledra Palace in order to dissuade bi-com-
munal activists from attending the meetings. Until the recent change 
of government in northern Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot authorities 
were much more suspicious of such bi-communal meetings that were 
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characterized as “fraternizing with the barbaric Greek Cypriot enemy.” 
This changed when the leader of the left-wing Republican People’s 
Party (CTP) came to power during 2003.
Left-wing groups and political parties on both sides had taken the 
initiative in creating conditions conducive to contacts, cooperation, 
dialogue, and the emergence of understanding between the two sides.17 
Before 1974 (especially before 1960), a lot of interethnic cooperation 
took place through left-wing institutions like trade unions. These links 
and feelings of solidarity among adherents of the Left on both sides 
persisted despite the division. After 1974, the Left on both sides began 
to more forcefully articulate an alternative discourse on nationalism 
based on what Anthony Smith would call civic nationalism. The two 
Lefts were united in articulating a sense of Cypriot identity that could 
join the people of a divided Cyprus, an identity based on shared terri-
tory and civic ties. In this sense, the two Lefts were trying to bridge the 
chasm of the Dead Zone while they became the initiators and driving 
force of bi-communal activities aimed at reconciliation. The two Lefts 
were also joined by a common experience of victimization, each by 
their own Right, when they tried to continue cooperating, especially 
during the tumultuous period from 1955 to 1974. For this reason, they 
were well aware that violence was never the prerogative of the other 
side alone.
By contrast, the two Rights preferred an alternative discourse on 
nationalism, what Smith would call ethnic nationalism, focusing on 
common descent, culture, and ethnic ties.18 They identified themselves 
first as Greeks or Turks, arguing that ties with the respective mother-
land were most important and that the history of Cyprus was part of 
the grand narrative of Greek or Turkish history.19 If the two Lefts, that 
frequently met in the Dead Zone, attempted to bridge the gap, the two 
Rights, by identifying with the two motherlands, pulled the two sides 
apart (toward the motherlands) and turned the division into a deeper 
chasm. The Left-Right divide manifested itself in the social landscape 
of Cyprus through the presence of separate coffee shops dotting many 
neighborhoods and villages. Eventually, however, the hopes that many 
placed on the two Lefts as the major forces that could push for a com-
promise solution were only partly realized during the critical referen-
dum for a solution that took place in April 2004.
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V. YES and NO
Has post-2004-referendum Cyprus reached a dead end in the road 
toward a reunited bi-zonal, bi-communal federal state as envisaged by 
UN resolutions since the late 1970s?
During February 2004, the two sides finally agreed that the long 
negotiated UN-brokered plan, known as the Annan Plan after the cur-
rent UN Secretary-General, would be placed on separate referenda 
for the two sides at the end of April. Yet by that time the Republic of 
Cyprus had gained entry into the EU, meaning that in effect only the 
areas under its control, i.e., the Greek Cypriot side, would become part 
of the EU until the Cyprus Problem was solved. This tipped the power 
balance. The logic of the whole UN effort was to strike a deal using the 
promise of the entry of Cyprus into the EU as a bargaining tool against 
the side that appeared unwilling to negotiate in good faith. But time 
ran out and the decision had to be made. Given that it was the Turkish 
Cypriot leader Denktash who was deemed responsible for the repeated 
failure of talks in Copenhagen (December 2002) and the Hague (March 
2003), the Greek Cypriots (i.e., the Republic of Cyprus-controlled side) 
received the green light for unconditional EU entry. The argument was 
that since the negotiation deadlock was the responsibility of the Turk-
ish Cypriot side, it would be unfair to hold Greek Cypriots hostage to 
Turkish Cypriot intransigence and deny the more constructive Greek 
Cypriot side EU entry.
During the February 2004 New York meeting, however, Mr. Den-
ktash, the Turkish Cypriot President and negotiator, relented by agree-
ing with the UN proposal for the plan to be put to a referendum. This 
time around, Denktash found himself under twin pressures coming 
from outside and inside. First, pressure came from the recently elected 
Turkish Cypriot Prime Minister Mr. Talat, leader of the left-wing CTP, 
who came to power with a clear pro-Annan Plan platform. The election 
was preceded by the largest post-1974 mobilization of Turkish Cypri-
ots, who staged huge demonstrations in favor of the Annan-Plan and 
EU entry, and against Denktash’s policies. Outside pressure came from 
Turkey, which no longer wanted to be accused of intransigence about 
the Cyprus Problem, an argument that could be used against its own 
EU accession. The Turkish government, headed by Mr. Erdogan, also 
feared that if Greek Cypriots entered into the EU alone (rather than as 
a federal, reunited Cyprus), they might then block its own path. In the 
meantime, the Greek Cypriot interlocutor at the negotiations changed 
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from President Clerides, a man known for his constructive and fair 
positions, to President Papadopoulos, a man notorious for his hard-
line stance and dislike for the Plan, if not the notion of a federation 
itself. Given the positive Turkish Cypriot reply to the UN Secretary’s 
demand for the plan to be put to referendum, like it or not, Mr. Papa-
dopoulos also agreed, so as not to be accused of being responsible for 
the negotiation’s failure.
In the meantime, a momentous change had occurred in the politi-
cal landscape of Cyprus with the April 2003 opening of the border 
by Denktash. Mr. Denktash’s motives were wildly disputed. Some 
argued that he had found himself under pressure from the huge Turk-
ish Cypriot demonstrations, others that he simply wanted to prove his 
point that people could live in two separate states, open to each other 
for economic cooperation. In any case, tens of thousands of people took 
advantage of this opening, crossing to the other side. The most hopeful 
sign of this development was the lack of violent incidents despite the 
emotional upheavals—not only joy, but often anger and sadness—that 
the moves entailed.
The Annan Plan was perhaps the longest and most complicated 
technical document ever drawn by the UN, as it involved not only 
the two sides of Cyprus but also Greece, Turkey, Britain, and the EU. 
Primarily, though, it was a plan that sought to balance the numer-
ous conflicting demands, fears, and aspirations of Greek Cypriots and 
Turkish Cypriots. Various observers (including this author) considered 
it a positive step forward, which, in conjunction with simultaneous 
EU entry of the island as a whole, could be made to work if there was 
sufficient goodwill and trust among the two sides (conditions that in 
retrospect may have been absent on the ground).
It was broadly expected that the UN Plan would receive a positive 
vote on the Turkish Cypriot side and there was cautious optimism 
it might be endorsed on the Greek Cypriot side, too. The optimism 
regarding Greek Cypriots was based on the expectation that since 
the right-wing DISY that had brought Clerides to power was favor-
able, then the left-wing party (AKEL) that had brought Papadopoulos 
to power would also eventually say the “Big YES.” The two parties 
together commanded almost 70% of Greek Cypriot votes. AKEL was 
known for its willingness to compromise, as being the party at the 
forefront of bi-communal efforts and highly respected on the Turkish 
Cypriot side, and as the most disciplined party in terms of its sup-
porters following party directives. Its stance supporting Papadopou-
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los had raised many eyebrows inside and outside of Cyprus. Yet, it 
was hoped that despite its recent gamble in order to come to power 
in a coalition with uncompromising DIKO, Mr. Papadopoulos’ party, 
it would rise to its historical role as the most significant force among 
Greek Cypriots in favor of a compromise and in support of the UN 
proposed federal solution. In the meantime, the atmosphere on the 
Greek Cypriot side had turned sour, with polls showing huge support 
of a NO vote (even as the same polls indicated that the large majority 
of Greek Cypriots had not read it). AKEL wavered and two days before 
the referendum chose to support the NO vote, claiming that sufficient 
guarantees for the implementation of the Plan were not provided. The 
Party announcement proclaimed that “we say NO in order to cement 
the YES,” meaning another referendum. Some observers felt that this 
outcome occurred because AKEL realized it was too late to turn the 
NO tide around (that AKEL had been partly responsible for by sup-
porting Papadopoulos), so it chose to safeguard its political future 
in power rather than take a hopeless risk. DISY chose to support the 
Annan Plan, even though it was likely to pay a heavy political price for 
this (which it did, as most of its supporters in fact voted for NO and 
the Party subsequently split). The result of the vote on 24 May 2004 
was a resounding 76% NO on the Greek Cypriot side and a strong 65% 
YES on the Turkish Cypriot one.
How can this be interpreted? Explanations that the Greek Cypriot 
government violated human rights and norms and imposed its will 
upon the people, though initially invoked, are not sufficient—even 
if there were signs of dubious interferences and EU officials openly 
proclaiming their dislike for the way the Greek Cypriot government 
handled the referendum campaign. Turkish Cypriots had much more 
to gain from a solution that would end their political and economic iso-
lation, bringing them into the elite club of the EU. Perhaps that made 
them more willing to put aside past grievances and more willing to 
compromise. On the Greek Cypriot side, the stakes were not as high, 
given that EU entry had already been secured.
The economic disparity between the two sides was arguably very 
significant. Turkish Cypriots, who were in dire financial difficulties, 
were more willing to accept the Plan in order to end their economic 
and political isolation. Greek Cypriots, who had been enjoying eco-
nomic prosperity, had no such motive to accept a radical change in the 
status quo. Greek Cypriots voted in the certainty of a high standard of 
living (the highest of the ten new countries under EU accession), guar-
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anteed EU entry, and international political recognition. In their case, 
the Annan Plan was a source of anxiety and uncertainty. The Greek 
Cypriot result was also the outcome of AKEL’s negative stance (due to 
reasons of political expediency).
Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, voted for the Annan Plan in 
order to end the uncertainties created by their economic and political 
isolation, mass emigration, and control by Turkey. For them, the Plan 
represented an end to uncertainty and a move toward a more certain 
and prosperous future.20
But what were the foundations that the successful NO campaign 
built upon? This is not an easy question, given the variety of reasons 
that people may have voted for NO. It should be noted that Greek 
Cypriot political rhetoric had never been based on true compromise. 
(Neither had Turkish Cypriot official rhetoric, but this was more easily 
put aside.) For decades Greek Cypriot political rhetoric, as expressed 
by almost all parties, was the chant of ALL: ALL refugees back to their 
homes; ALL Turkish settlers out of Cyprus; ALL Turkish troops out 
of Cyprus. Even if on paper a federal solution had been agreed upon 
in 1977, even if this was to be a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation that 
meant not all refugees would be able to return—though all would be 
compensated—this had never been spelled out. The very idea of fed-
eration, although on the table for almost thirty years, had never been 
discussed or explained, so Greek Cypriots saw it as an alien, unnatural 
political arrangement. One key aspect of the federal ideal, political 
equality, was presented as an abhorrent notion whereby “the minority 
of 18% will control the majority 80%.” Intervention rights by Turkey 
to safeguard an independent federal Cyprus and the eventual pres-
ence of a nominal Turkish force were seen by Greek Cypriots as grave 
threats. Turkish Cypriot fears were never taken into account. This was 
a result of the amnesia over the sad events of the 1960s and of the 
coup, which shifted all blame to “barbaric Turkish expansionism.” The 
YES campaigners, employing the rhetoric of a “painful compromise,” 
were trying to build on thin air. “Why compromise us who have never 
wronged?,” many people were bound to ask. Last, but not least, the 
rigid Left-Right divide had foreclosed the possibility of AKEL support-
ing DISY in re-electing Clerides.
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VI. Inside and Outside
One fine Saturday morning, Greek Cypriots, having slept in this island 
uncertainly placed between Asia, Africa and Europe, finally woke up 
firmly in Europe. This was 1 May 2004, when Cyprus officially joined 
the EU “forever,” as Papadopoulos proclaimed. Among spectacular 
fireworks and celebrations, Cyprus triumphantly became the ninth 
and two-thirds new country in the EU. It failed to become the tenth 
since only the Greek Cypriot side (the areas controlled by the Republic 
of Cyprus) became part of the EU. Despite the YES vote on the Turkish 
Cypriot side, Turkish Cypriots found themselves outside the EU.
However, the Greek Cypriot dream of becoming European once 
and for all soon turned into an embarrassment. Entering Europe was 
regarded by many Greek Cypriots as the final proof that Cyprus was 
not part of the Third World—the word “Third Worldly” (tritokosmiko) 
having come to mean corrupt, undemocratic, and uncivilized. Instead 
of escaping the so-called Third World, Greek Cypriots were shocked 
to see themselves treated as its exemplars, as the new barbarians of 
Europe. They faced accusations that the Greek Cypriot government 
had employed all kinds of dirty tricks during the referendum to orches-
trate the NO result. Top EU officials openly spoke of being cheated by 
the Greek Cypriot leader (a remark soon to be repeated in more diplo-
matic language by the UN Secretary-General himself). As if these were 
not enough, a bomb exploded outside the residence of the leader of the 
main party that supported a YES vote—not the best sign of a tolerant, 
democratic society. Turkish Cypriots were disappointed but at least 
saw their leader, Mr. Talat, welcomed and appreciated abroad among 
warm talk of measures to end their isolation and help them financially. 
The cease-fire line of Cyprus became the EU’s new uncertain border in 
the east. •
Notes
1. I am indebted to Constantinou 2004 (p. 158) for these quotes.
2. Constantinou 2004, p. 159.
3. See Argyrou (1996) for a wide-ranging discussion of how Greek Cypriots conceptual-
ize and submit to the symbolic hegemony of Europe.
4. For a comparable situation, see Whyte’s (1990) discussion of analytical models applied 
to the Irish Problem, where interpretations focusing on local agency (and responsibility) 
only emerged at a relatively late stage. For a recent wide-ranging analysis of the Cyprus 
Problem that comments on the issue of local agency vis-à-vis external interferences, see 
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Heraclides (2002), who considers local agency as the most significant factor in this dis-
pute.
5. Herzfeld 1997, p. 127.
6. Given 1997; 1998.
7. Given 1998, p. 13.
8. Given 1997.
9. See also Kitromilides (1979) for the dynamics of the historical development of Greek 
and Turkish nationalism in Cyprus during the colonial period and how the interplay of 




12. For general accounts of the events of this period, see Purcell (1969, pp. 300–402) 
and Patrick (1976). For a more detailed account of the lives of Turkish Cypriots in the 
enclaves, see Volkan (1979).
13. Occasionally, however, political parties or other groups within each side may dispute 
the idea of a federation. When this is disputed from the Greek Cypriot side, the argu-
ment usually is that a federation is still too divisive. If disputed from groups on the Turk-
ish Cypriot side, the argument is that it is too integrationist and more separation should 
be allowed for, along with more integration with Turkey. The most serious official chal-
lenge to the idea of a federation emerged in 1998 when Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot 
leader, announced that confederation now was the Turkish Cypriot objective.
14. For the two side’s official constructions of memory (and forgetting) through com-
memorations, see Papadakis (1993).
15. For a lively personal account of the challenges of setting up the Nicosia Master Plan 
and the joint sewerage system, see Demetriades (1998). For a general description of what 
the Master Plan entailed, see Petridou (1998).
16. In practice this meant that some bi-communal efforts were discouraged by the author-
ities of the Republic of Cyprus due to the overwhelming fear of recognition. The rule was 
that meetings, activities, and events in which people participated as individuals were to 
be encouraged but whatever implied an official or institutional capacity was deemed risky 
of lending recognition to the Turkish Cypriot state. But where the line should be drawn 
was never clear. For more discussion of the bi-communal movement and the politics 
involved, see Constantinou and Papadakis (2001) and Hadjipalvou-Trigeorgis (1997).
17. The left-wing parties referred to here are AKEL (Rising Party of the Working People) 
on the Greek Cypriot side, and CTP (Republican Turkish Party) along with TKP (Com-
munal Liberation Party) on the Turkish Cypriot side.
18. The parties of the Right referred to here are DISY (Democratic Rally) on the Greek 
Cypriot side, and UBP (National Unity Party) along with DP (Democratic Party) on the 
Turkish Cypriot side.
19. For a discussion of the different narratives of the past between Left and Right on the 
Greek Cypriot side, see Papadakis (1998).
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20. For sustained analyses of the referendum results, see Bryant (2004), Tocci (2004), 
and Jakobsson Hatay (2004). The issue of certainty/uncertainty and relative risk is high-
lighted by the first two analysts.
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